A series of federal appellate cases have held that Type I diabetes constitutes a disability under the more stringent federal standards. A person with Type I diabetes is disabled with respect to the major life activity of eating.
The Lawson court reasoned that Type I diabetes requires the careful monitoring and strict adherence to a perpetual, multifaceted and demanding treatment regime disabling somebody. The testing of one's blood multiple times a day and the administration of insulin injections are substantial limitations on major life activity.
The disabling symptoms of Type I diabetes such as dizziness and weakness were also found to be disabling. The court believed it was disabling not to be able to eat when one wants to and to always be concerned with the availability of food, the timing of eating, and the quantity of food taken in.
The court ruled that eating is a major life activity. The court further reasoned that diabetes affects many organ systems including metabolic, vascular, urinary, and reproductive systems as well as the joints and eyes and negatively impacts high blood pressure thereby creating a physical or mental impairment under 45 C.F.R. 84.3(j)(2)(i).
The court distinguished the wearing of corrective lenses to neutralize a disability from diabetes which involves the coordination of multifaceted factors of constant vigilance.
In determining that diabetes, even if ameliorated through medication, was a protected disability Arnold v. United Parcel, (7th Cir. 1998) quoted from the House Labor Report on the ADA, No. 101-485 pt. II at page 52 (1990) stating "persons with impairments such as epilepsy or diabetes...'are considered to have an actual disability' even if the effects of the impairment are controlled by medication."
Also see Gilday v. Mecosta County (6th Cir. 1997) and
Baert v. Euclid Beverage (7th Cir. 1998) holding that there was a triable issue of fact whether diabetes was a disability since it is permanent. Also note that in
Baert the plaintiff had to inject himself with insulin, and had been hospitalized for 5 days. The 7th Circuit found this to be evidence of a disability.
Inability to sleep can be a major life activity, McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1999). Thus, that symptom that Plaintiff complains of is considered disabling.
Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S.Ct. 2196 (1998) held that procreation is a major life activity under the ADA. Thus, that symptoms of Plaintiff's diabetes makes it a disability.